Source: Mr. "X" on the Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947
. . . [I]t will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. . . .
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. . . .
It
would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could
exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about
the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its
power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must
operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and
circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to
promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the
break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. . . .