Monroe Doctrine (1823)
events:
Latin America revolts (seeks independence from...) against
weakened Spain (Napoleonic Wars) -- U.S. - Latin American (Cuban) trade grows
despite Spanish/Portuguese mercantile regulations -- U.S. claims neutrality but
supports rebels with unofficial recognition/nonmilitary supplies
motives behind enunciation:
desire to have weak (independent) nations on southern border --
desire to export revolutionary/democratic ideals -- desire to open Latin
American nations to free trade (U.S. dominated) -- fear of reactionary European
monarchs ("concert") seeking to reestablish colonization -- fear of
Russian expansion into Canada/Oregon Territory -- hope of annexing Cuba
("jewel of the Antilles")
declaration:
Q. Adams (Secretary of State) warns Monroe against joint
declaration with Britain -- fear of British trade domination -- colonial stigma
("like a cock-boat in the wake of a British man-o'-war")
Monroe delivers declaration as part of state of the union address
-- hopes to build national pride/nationalism in wake of sectional War of 1812
-- hopes to distract populace (Panic of 1819/economic depression) with foreign
policy
ideals:
U.S. recognition of independent Latin American nations -- Western
Hemisphere closed to further European colonization -- U.S. will protect Western
Hemisphere (militarily) from European aggression/colonization -- U.S. will stay
out of European affairs/hemispheric isolationism/Washington precedent
results:
national pride soars/some international respectability gained --
isolationism promoted/friendly (interventionist) relations with Latin America
established -- Russians hesitate to move into Oregon Territory -- British navy
(not U.S. power) enforces Doctrine for first forty years -- U.S. Doctrine
enforcement left to the office of the president/presidential powers expanded
Source: The Monroe
Doctrine as expressed during President Monroe's seventh annual message to
Congress, December 2, 1823:
. . . At the proposal of
the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor
residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the
minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable
negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the
northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His
Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been
acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this
friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably
attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the
best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this
interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the
occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the
rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American
continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and
maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future
colonization by any European powers. . .
It was stated at the
commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain
and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and
that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need
scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very different from what
was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we
have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always
been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States
cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of
their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European
powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does
it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or
seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.
With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately
connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial
observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different
in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which
exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which
has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed
unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to
candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and
those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to
extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace
and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we
have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have
declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on
great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other
manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war
between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time
of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to
adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgement
of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding
change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.
The late events in Spain
and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be
adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any
principle satisfactory to themselves, to have
interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such
interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all
independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even
those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our
policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars
which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the
same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers;
to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to
cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a
frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of
every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those
continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is
impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any
portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor
can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves,
would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that
we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look
to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments,
and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never
subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties
to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . . .